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“Having looked at monetary policy from both sides now, 
I can testify that central banking in practice is as much 
art as science. Nonetheless, while practicing this dark 
art, I have always found the science quite useful.”  
– Alan S. Blinder1 
Abstract 
This paper considers how monetary policy is modelled 
currently, with particular reference to the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand’s dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model: Kiwi 
Inflation Targeting Technology (K.I.T.T.).  By considering the 
role and objectives of monetary policy along with its dynamic 
effects, it is suggested that monetary policy might better be 
modelled using micro-foundations, where the path of monetary 
policy is determined by an optimising central bank. In the 
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context of the New Zealand economy, the monetary authority’s 
optimisation problem is postulated and developed. To conclude, 
an alternative monetary policy reaction function is suggested for 
use in K.I.T.T.. 
1 Introduction 
In the context of a given model, the reaction function is a 
description of endogenous monetary policy. It takes into 
consideration the consequences of any economic disturbance 
and, as such, prompts an automatic response by the model’s 
central bank. The reaction function plays a significant role in the 
model, particularly via the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy which reflects the intrinsic and systemic effects of 
monetary policy on the dynamic economy it depicts. An 
effective reaction function provides a reasonable description of 
the central bank as it responds to economic conditions, 
appropriately describes the channels through which monetary 
policy affects behaviour, and ensures cohesive interactions 
between the central bank and other agents in the model.  
This paper seeks to consider the role and importance of the 
reaction function, particularly in the context of modelling the 
New Zealand economy. It proceeds as follows: Section 2 
considers how monetary policy is modelled, with particular 
reference to current practice; Section 3 develops an optimising 
monetary policy rule for use in the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand’s Kiwi Inflation Targeting Technology model(K.I.T.T.) 
(the derivations for which can be found in the Appendix); and 
Section 4 concludes.   
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2 Modelling monetary policy 
This section considers the reaction function and its role in 
modelling monetary policy; its structure is as follows. 
Subsection 2.1 introduces the role of the reaction function in 
communicating monetary policy objectives; Subsection 2.2 
introduces the role of the loss function; Subsection 2.3 discusses 
the transmission mechanism in a modelling context; and 
Subsection 2.4 describes current practice in modelling monetary 
policy reaction functions. 
2.1 Monetary policy objectives 
When considering the reaction function and the role of 
monetary policy, it is assumed that the monetary authority 
operates in accordance with a targeting rule rather than an 
instrument rule. An instrument rule prescribes how the central 
bank’s monetary policy instrument should respond to economic 
conditions as a specific function of forward-looking economic 
variables. In practice, no central bank can realistically commit to 
such a rule. Targeting rules, on the other hand, commit the 
monetary authority to targeting specific economic variables 
when conducting monetary policy. Such rules are a closer 
representation of the true decision framework and practice of 
inflation-targeting central banks (Svensson, 1999).  
It is also assumed that the central bank is inflation-targeting, 
and that monetary policy is conducted with short-term interest 
rates as the policy instrument, where interest rates are a key 
influence on output and inflation. Inflation targeting regimes are 
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interpreted as having explicit inflation targets and implicit 
targets for other economic variables, specifically employment 
(Svensson, 1997). Monetary policy should be modelled in a way 
which is consistent with these objectives – that is, the monetary 
policy instrument should be modelled as responding to other 
target variables in addition to inflation (whether they are 
implicit or explicit targets), in order for it to be a true depiction 
of central bank behaviour. 
Within a given model, explicit representation of the 
monetary policy objectives which underpin central bank 
behaviour is achieved through the inclusion of an appropriate 
reaction function, which should be consistent with the objectives 
of the monetary authority. The reaction function therefore 
describes how the policy rate—that is, the short-term interest 
rate—is determined within a model. Specifically, the reaction 
function communicates the underlying goal and means of 
implementing monetary policy, and creates expectations 
consistent with the achievement of these goals (Svensson, 1997). 
2.2 The role of the loss function 
The loss function is a representation of the central bank’s 
preferences with regards to its monetary policy objectives. It is 
essentially an expression of the central bank’s targets and 
objectives, where the bank is charged with minimising the loss 
to society arising from instability in the target variables 
(Svensson, 1997). As assumed previously, the central bank 
operates according to a targeting rule. This can be interpreted as 
the assignment of a particular loss function to be minimised by 
the central bank (Svensson, 1999). In a modelling context, the 
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loss function therefore plays a key role in communicating the 
objectives of monetary policy.   
Monetary policy in an inflation-targeting framework with 
an operationally independent central bank works in the 
following way. Society delegates the role and objectives of 
monetary policy to the central bank in the form of explicit and 
implicit targeting rules – that is, society assigns a loss function 
to the central bank. The monetary authority is then given 
operational independence to minimise the assigned loss 
function—this is the optimisation problem of the central bank—
where the central bank is held accountable for the minimisation 
of this loss function (Svensson 1997). The loss function, 
therefore, provides a description of central bank behaviour 
based on sound microeconomic foundations. 
2.3 The importance of the 
transmission mechanism 
The literature suggests that, rather than seeking to influence 
target variables themselves, it is usually more efficient for the 
monetary policy instrument to respond to determinants of the 
target variables (Svensson, 1999). How these variables are 
determined is, therefore, a key aspect of modelling monetary 
policy and is significant in the derivation of an appropriate 
monetary policy reaction function. Consequentially it is 
desirable to express the reaction function of endogenous 
monetary policy in terms of the variables which influence 
monetary policy target variables, rather than the target variables 
themselves.   
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Not only should a model incorporate the goals of monetary 
policy in the form of a loss function, it should also include the 
mechanisms by which these goals are achieved (Coletti et al, 
1996). An accurate description of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism is therefore an important aspect of any 
model where there is a role for endogenous monetary policy. 
The transmission mechanism describes the effect of monetary 
policy in terms of the mechanisms through which the impact on 
determinant variables is transmitted to its target variables.  It is 
therefore a key determinant of how effective monetary policy is 
in achieving central bank objectives. 
Moreover, the central bank must conduct monetary policy 
within the context of the model, and subject to the dynamic 
relationships between economic variables specifically. For 
example, a tension exists between inflation and employment 
targeting, at least in the short run. Interaction between the 
reaction function and an explicit representation of the Phillips 
curve to model this relationship can provide insight with regards 
to this issue (Coletti et al, 1996). Such relationships between 
economic variables affect the central bank’s ability to conduct 
monetary policy in an optimal manner. The monetary authority 
must carry out monetary policy—that is, minimise its loss 
function—subject to these constraints, where these constraints 
capture the dynamic effects of monetary policy on the model.   
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2.4 Current practice 
The Forecasting and Policy System (FPS), the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand’s (RBNZ) previous core macroeconomic 
model, contains a forward-looking monetary policy reaction 
function which describes the monetary authority as adjusting 
short term interest rates when inflation is projected to deviate 
from target (Black et al, 1997). This approach is common in the 
literature. For example, the Bank of England’s Quarterly Model 
(BEQM) also uses a simple interest rate rule which ensures that 
inflation is maintained at the target level while assuming some 
smoothing of interest rates (Harrison et al, 2005). The reaction 
functions in both FPS and BEQM do not describe the policy rate 
as responding to determinants of its target variables as is 
desirable. Instead, the policy rate responds to movements in the 
target variable itself, specifically inflation, as is common in the 
literature.  
The reaction function in FPS is characterised by the 
distinction it makes between short- and long-term interest rates, 
where the short-term rate is the policy instrument which 
determines the term structure of other interest rates, and all rates’ 
impact on agents’ decision-making. However, FPS, like most 
models, does not consider stability of output or other real 
variables in its description of monetary authority behaviour, nor 
does it model optimising behaviour on the part of the central 
bank (Black et al, 1997).  
The RBNZ’s current core economic model, K.I.T.T., is a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. K.I.T.T. 
provides a useful description of the New Zealand economy for 
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the purpose of forecasting and policymaking. It provides a 
comprehensive macroeconomic story developed from micro-
economic foundations, and is consistent with key features of the 
New Zealand business cycle (Beneš et al, 2009). 
Within K.I.T.T. the monetary authority is assumed to set 
semi-endogenous monetary policy according to a simple interest 
rate rule like that in BEQM. While the model is otherwise rich 
in micro-economic foundations, the monetary policy reaction 
function is not based on optimising behaviour on the part of the 
central bank. Developing a new policy rule would, therefore, be 
useful in improving the model currently in use, and is an 
important avenue of future research (Beneš et al, 2009). This 
idea is further developed in the next section. 
3 Developing a new reaction 
function for use in K.I.T.T 
The RBNZ’s core macroeconomic model, K.I.T.T, is 
specifically designed to answer questions about monetary policy. 
A model designed to answer such questions should contain clear 
rules for monetary policy along with a reasonable description of 
the transmission mechanism and dynamic effects on the whole 
economy (Coletti et al 1996).  This section considers how such a 
rule might be developed for K.I.T.T.. Subsection 3.1 considers 
the RBNZ’s monetary policy objectives; subsection 3.2 
proposes a loss function to be minimised by the monetary 
authority in accordance with these objectives; subsection 3.3 
considers the role of the transmission mechanism in determining 
the model’s optimal path of monetary policy; and subsection 3.4 
suggests an alternative reaction function for use in determining 
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the path of endogenous monetary policy within K.I.T.T. 
Relevant derivations can be found in the Appendix.  
3.1 Monetary Policy Objectives 
No central bank sets monetary policy with only inflation in 
mind (Hunt, 2004). This is certainly true of the RBNZ. Clause 
4(b) of the Policy Targets Agreement (PTA) states that 
‘In pursuing its price stability objective, the Bank shall 
implement monetary policy in a sustainable, consistent 
and transparent manner and shall seek to avoid 
unnecessary instability in output, interest rates and the 
exchange rate.’ (RBNZ, 2008)  
This implies that the RBNZ does not attempt to control 
inflation in a rigid manner regardless of the effects on other 
economic variables, but also attempts to minimise volatility in 
output, interest rates and the exchange rate, while achieving low 
and stable inflation. This acknowledges the fact that output, 
interest rate and exchange rate volatility are likely to be 
detrimental to growth and economic welfare (Hunt, 2004). 
Monetary policy may need to respond to other economic 
variables in achieving its objectives, rather than variability in 
target variables themselves. This is due to the dynamic and 
interactive relationships of economic variables (Hunt, 2004). It 
is therefore desirable to derive a reaction function which 
captures central bank responsiveness to determinants of its 
target variables. 
The PTA makes it clear that only unnecessary volatility in 
output, interest rates and exchange rates need be avoided. Some 
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degree of economic volatility is necessary for the economy to 
adjust to changing economic conditions. This is especially true 
of the exchange rate.  Exchange rate movements reduce the need 
for adjustment in other areas of the economy in response to 
economic shocks (Hunt, 2004).  
Furthermore, exchange rate stability is likely to be 
associated with volatility in other key economic variables, 
particularly inflation, output and interest rates. As a 
consequence, the targeting of exchange rate volatility may 
conflict with other monetary policy objectives.  
It is also difficult for the monetary authority to respond to 
determinants of exchange rates, as the rate fluctuates more than 
interest rate differentials alone can justify, making exchange rate 
targeting difficult to model (Hargreaves, 2002). When deriving a 
reaction function for use in modelling the New Zealand 
economy, we do not consider exchange rate stabilisation as a 
monetary policy objective, though it is acknowledged that this is 
an important aspect of the RBNZ’s role in stabilising the New 
Zealand economy. 
3.2 The loss function 
The following quadratic loss function is proposed for the 
monetary authority in K.I.T.T, as is standard in the literature.  !! = 12 !! − 2 ! + ! !! − ! ! + ! !! − !!!! !  
where Lt is the total loss to the central bank in period t; 2% 
is the middle of the inflation target band; πt is CPI inflation in 
period t; Yt is actual output in period t; Y is potential output; Yt – 
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Y measures the output gap; λ ≥ 0 is the weight the RBNZ places 
on stabilising the output gap relative to inflation; rt is the policy 
rate in period t; µ ≥ 0 is the relative weight of interest rate 
smoothing. 
This describes the RBNZ as being concerned with price, 
interest-rate and output stability in accordance with its monetary 
policy objectives, as outlined in the PTA. Its preferences in 
achieving output and interest rate stability relative to its goal of 
price stability are captured by parameters λ and µ respectively.  
Substituting in the definition of CPI found in K.I.T.T. 
yields, !! = 12 1− !! − !! − !! !!! + !!!!! + !!!!!+!!!!! − 2 !+ ! !! − ! ! + ! !! − !!!! !  
where vc, vτ, vf are the weights of construction-cost, 
tradables inflation and petrol-price inflation in CPI respectively; 
πtn is non-tradables inflation; πtc is construction-cost inflation; πtτ 
is tradables inflation; and πtf is petrol-price inflation.  
3.3 The transmission mechanism 
Modelling the behaviour of the monetary authority requires 
effective representation of the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy. In K.I.T.T., there are four major channels 
through which monetary policy operates. These are via the 
exchange rate, consumption-demand, investment-demand, and 
expectations formation.  
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The exchange rate channel is described by the uncovered 
interest parity (UIP) condition and describes how the nominal 
exchange rates respond to interest-rate differentials caused by 
changes in monetary policy (Beneš et al, 2009). The RBNZ 
minimises the loss function subject to the uncovered interest 
parity condition. This relationship is represented by expressing 
movements in the exchange rate in terms of interest rate 
differentials and, thus, as a function of the policy rate. This is 
substituted into the loss function where appropriate.  
The consumption-demand, investment-demand and 
expectations channels are captured in the Phillips curve 
relationship. The consumption-demand channel describes the 
effect that monetary policy has on agents who substitute 
between leisure and consumption as the price of borrowing 
changes. This, in turn, affects both tradables and non-tradables 
inflation. The investment-demand channel captures the effect of 
monetary policy on the expected return of business and 
residential investment. This has subsequent effects on demand 
for the intermediate good and construction-cost inflation. The 
expectations channel describes the systemic effect of changes in 
monetary policy on expectations formation, where agents 
incorporate rational expectations into their optimising behaviour 
(Beneš et al, 2009).   
The effects on expectations formation, investment demand 
and consumption demand feed through to the Phillips curve 
which, in turn, influences output and inflation. With regards to 
deriving a reaction function for K.I.T.T., the effects of changing 
policy rates on expectations, investment and consumption 
demand are taken into account by minimising the loss function 
subject to the Phillips curve relationship. This relationship is 
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expressed by restating the Phillips curve for the respective 
components of CPI inflation in terms of policy rates and 
substituting these into the loss function.  This is effective in 
capturing the dynamic effects of changes in the policy rate on 
output, inflation and, ultimately, the endogenous path of 
monetary policy in the model. 
Using equations found in K.I.T.T., derivations of general 
functional forms for the components of the loss function in 
terms of the policy rate are found in the appendix. These capture 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy described by 
UIP and Phillips curve relationships found in K.I.T.T.. 
Substituting these into the loss function yields the general 
functional form of the loss function subject to the policy rate,  
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!!= 12 1− !! − !! − !! !! !, !! , !!!!…− !! !! , !!!!,… , ℎ! !, !! , !!!!… ,!! !!! − !!!!! ,…+ !!! !! !, !! , !!!!…− !! !! , !!!!,… , !"!! !! , !!!!,…!! ,!! !!! − !!!!! ,…  + !!! !" !! !, !! , !!!!,!!!!!!!!− !! !! , !,… , !! !, !!!!!!,… , !" !! !, !! , !!!!!!!!!!,…!!− !! !! , !,… ,!! !!!!! − !!! ,… +!!! !, !! , !!!!,!!!!!!,…
− 2 ! + ! ! !! ,!!!!!!,… − ! ! + ! !! − !!!! !  
where !!!!!!  is the nominal exchange rate expressed as 
units of foreign currency per New Zealand dollar in period t+1 
as expected in period t. 
3.4 The reaction function 
The optimisation problem of the monetary authority is 
described as follows. The monetary authority chooses the 
optimal path of monetary policy in period t so as to minimise the 
loss function (above) over the medium term. This is subject to 
the Phillips curve relationship and UIP condition within the 
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context of the model, where these constraints capture the role 
and dynamic effects of monetary policy on the model.  
According to the PTA, the central bank is responsible for 
achieving its desired objectives over the medium term, where 
we assume that the medium term is a twelve quarter time 
horizon. Hence, in period t, the RBNZ chooses !! , !!!!,… , !!!!"  to minimise, !! = !!!!!"!!!  
where Vt is the loss to the central bank over a 12 period 
horizon—the intertemporal loss function—and !! , !!!!,… , !!!!"  describes the path of monetary policy. This 
implies that to achieve its monetary policy objectives, the 
central bank chooses the optimal path of monetary policy at time 
t such that this intertemporal loss function is minimised, and 
adjusts the policy rate accordingly. 
The optimisation problem of the RBNZ is therefore given 
by, min!!,!!!!,…,!!!!" !! 
First order conditions are found by computing, !!!!!! = 0;    !!!!!!!! = 0;… ;    !!!!!!!!" = 0 
Solving these first order conditions simultaneously yields a 
reaction function of the following general form, 
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!! = !! !!!!,!!!! ,!!!!!!,…+ !! … , !!!!, !!!!,!!!!!!,!!!!!!,…+ !! !,…  
This is the endogenous reaction function of the loss-
minimising central bank. To allow for exogenous monetary 
policy shocks we introduce a shock term, !!! , where the 
following semi-endogenous interest rate rule is postulated for 
use in K.I.T.T.  !! = !! !!!!,!!!! ,!!!!!!,…+ !! … , !!!!, !!!!,!!!!!!,!!!!!!,…+ !! !,… + !!! 
As can be seen from the proposed reaction function, the 
optimal policy rate at time t is specifically related to, among 
other variables, the path of monetary policy which minimises 
the inter-temporal loss function over the medium term. The 
choice of policy rate in period t, as determined by the reaction 
function, is consistent with the smoothing of interest rates while 
stabilising output and inflation. This rule arises as a result of 
optimising behaviour on the part of the model’s central bank, 
where this is consistent with the objectives of the RBNZ 
according to the PTA.  
In comparison, the reaction function currently in use has no 
loss-minimising behavioural underpinnings. Rather, it is an ad 
hoc rule where the policy rate in the current period responds to 
the expected inflation gap one period in advance subject to 
interest rate smoothing. This is not consistent with the objectives 
of the PTA, nor is it determined by microeconomic behavioural 
underpinnings. As such, an alternative policy rule like the 
general form reaction function derived here would provide a 
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more detailed description of the RBNZ’s policy setting 
behaviour consistent RBNZ objectives and with the proposed 
approach described by the central bank modelling literature.   
4 Conclusion 
Monetary policy reaction functions are a useful tool in 
modelling central bank behaviour. Effective modelling of 
monetary policy requires an accurate depiction of central bank 
objectives and the transmission mechanism through which 
monetary policy operates. The development of a reaction 
function, such as the one developed here for use in K.I.T.T., 
would be advantageous for any model where there is a role for 
endogenous monetary policy. This suggested improvement on 
current practice is premised on the idea that reaction functions 
should be founded on micro-economic relationships, consistent 
with the decision framework and practice of monetary policy, 
and expressed in terms of variables which influence the 
achievement of these objectives.  
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Appendix: Deriving a monetary 
policy reaction function for K.I.T.T 
Equation references are to K.I.T.T: Kiwi Inflation Targeting 
Technology (Beneš et al, 2009).  The numbers of original 
equations are indicated in the text below, which may have been 
simplified for clarity; all other equations are derived. The loss 
function and central bank optimisation problem are imposed.   
A1 The loss function 
A1.1 General form 
I propose a quadratic loss function as is standard in the 
literature. This is given by,   !! = 12 !! − 2 ! + ! !! − ! ! + ! !! − !!!! !  
where 2% is the middle of the inflation target band; πt is 
CPI inflation in period t; Yt is actual output in period t; Y is 
potential output; Yt – Y measures the output gap; λ ≥ 0 is the 
weight of stabilising the output gap relative to inflation; rt is the 
policy rate in period t; µ ≥ 0 is the relative weight of interest rate 
smoothing. 
A1.2 Defining CPI and the resulting 
loss function for K.I.T.T.  
From equation 2.69, the CPI inflation rate in K.I.T.T. is 
defined as, !! = 1− !! − !! − !! !!! + !!!!! + !!!!!+!!!!!   
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where vc, vτ, vf are the weights of construction-cost, 
tradables inflation and petrol-price inflation in CPI respectively. 
πtn is non-tradables inflation; πtc is construction-cost inflation; πtτ 
is tradables inflation; πtf is petrol-price inflation.  
Hence, we can substitute this into the loss function, !! = 12 1− !! − !! − !! !!! + !!!!!+ !!!!!+!!!!! − 2 ! + ! !! − ! !+ ! !! − !!!! !  
A2 Deriving functional forms for 
components of the loss function 
A2.1 Tradables inflation: 
From the following simplified version of K.I.T.T. equation 
2.91, the Phillips curve for the tradable sector, we know that, !!! = !(!! ,!! ,!! ,!! !!!!! − !!! ,… ) 
where !! = !" !!!!!!!! − !" !!!!!  ; !! = !" !!!!! − !" !!!!!  ; !! = !" !!!!! − !" !!!!! 
Now, Ptq is the price of non-oil imports in domestic 
currency and St is the nominal exchange rate expressed in terms 
of units of foreign currency per New Zealand dollar. Variables 
without time subscripts denote steady state values. Therefore,  !!! = !!$!!! ,  
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where Pt$q is the price of non-oil imports determined by an 
exogenous process. Call this f0, !! !! ,… = !!$!!!  
UIP is described in K.I.T.T. equation 2.138, !! − ! − !!! − !! + !! !" !!!!! − !" !!!   = ! !!!! − ! − !!!!! − !!+ !" !!! − !" !!!!! + !!! 
where rtf is the foreign interest rate at time t. Hence, we can 
generalise this as  !! = !! !, !!!!!!!!!!!!,…  
Therefore,  !! !, !! , !!!!!!!!!!,… = !!$!!! !, !!!!!!!!!!!!,…    
Ptz is the price of the intermediate good. Now, from 
equation 2.118, !"!!!!! = !! − ! + !"!!!!! − !" !!!  
From K.I.T.T. equations 2.26 and 2.29, we can see that the 
production of the intermediate good is positively correlated with 
the capital stock. Further, from equation 2.114, we can see that 
the capital stock in the current period is determined by the 
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capital stock in the previous period and business investment. We 
generalise this relationship by the function fz.  
Hence, define the following function, f1, !! !, !! ,… = !! − ! + !"!!!!! − !" !! !!!!, !!! ,…!  
where rt is the policy rate in period t, r is the natural interest rate. 
From K.I.T.T. equation 2.25, we can see that investment in 
capital, Itk, is positively correlated with the household’s 
discounted future stream of (imputed) earnings from business 
investment and negatively correlated with the cost of tradable 
goods (where the price of tradable goods is negatively correlated 
with the effective interest rate – see equations 2.105, 2.103 and 
2.24). 
Equation 2.14 shows that the household’s discounted future 
stream of (imputed) earnings from business investment is 
negatively correlated with the effective interest rate rth over all 
periods. We can express this as,  Φ!! = !! !!! , !!!!! ,…  
where the household’s effective interest rate is given by 
equation 2.24 below, !!! = !! + ! !!Φ!!!! − !  
Therefore,  
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!! !, !!!!!!,… = !! − ! ++!"!!!!!− !" !! !!!!, !! , !!!!,…!  
Ptf is the petrol price in domestic currency and St is the 
nominal exchange rate expressed in terms of units of foreign 
currency per New Zealand dollar. Therefore,  !!! = !!$!!! , 
where Pt$f, is the price of petrol in foreign currency and 
determined by an exogenous process. Call this f2,  !! !! ,… = !!$!!!  
As derived previously, !! = !! !, !! , !!!!,!!!!!!,…   
Therefore !! !, !! , !!!!,!!!!!!,… = !!$!!! !, !! , !!!!,!!!!!!,…  
Now, by K.I.T.T. equations 2.105, 2.103 and 2.24, !"!!!!! = !1− ! !" !!!!!!! − 11− ! !" !!!!! − !" Λ!Λ  !" Λ!Λ = !!! − ! + !"!!Λ!!!Λ − !!! !!! = !! + ! !!Φ!!!! − !  
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Combining these, !"!!!!! = !1− ! !" !!!!!!! − 11− ! !" !!!!! − !!− ! !!Φ!!!! − ! + ! − !"!!Λ!!!Λ  
Call this f3, !! !! , !,… = !1− ! !" !!!!!!! − 11− ! !" !!!!! − !!− ! !!Φ!!!! − ! + ! − !"!!Λ!!!Λ  
Hence, we can express tradables inflation in the following 
way, !!!= ! !" !! !, !! , !!!!,!!!!!!!!− !! !! , !,… , !! !, !!!!!!,… , !" !! !, !! , !!!!!!!!!!,…!!− !! !! , !,… ,!! !!!!! − !!! ,…  
A2.2 Construction-cost inflation: 
From K.I.T.T. equation 2.93, the Phillips curve for the 
construction sector, we know that, !!! = ! !! ,!! ,!! !!! − !!!!! ,…  
where 
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 !! = !" !!!!! 
As shown previously from equation 2.118, !! = !"!!!!! = !! − ! + !"!!!!! − !" !!!  
Further, as we derived in the previous example,  !! = !! !, !! ,…= !! − ! + !"!!!!!− !" !! !!!!, !!! ,…!  
Now, we are told that!!! = !!! , where !!!  is aggregate 
housing investment demand. Therefore,  !! = !" !!!!! 
The household’s first order condition for residential 
investment, K.I.T.T. equation 2.16, is given by,  !!Φ!! !!! !!!!!!! = 1+ !! !"!!! − !"!!!!! − !!!!  
From this expression we can see that housing investment 
demand is positively correlated with the household’s discounted 
future stream of (imputed) earnings from housing services and 
negatively correlated with the cost of residential investment. We 
generalise this relationship by function g0. !!! = !! Φ!! ,!!! ,…  
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Equations 2.11 and 2.13 also show that the household’s 
future stream of (imputed) earnings from housing services is 
negatively correlated with the effective interest rate over all 
periods. We can generalise this relationship by function g1. Φ!! = !! !!! , !!!!! ,…  
where  !!! = !! + ! !!Φ!!!! − !  
Hence, housing investment is a decreasing function of the 
policy rate.   
This implies,  !!! = !! !!! , !! , !!!!,…  
The cost of residential investment is given by K.I.T.T. 
equation 2.112, !"!!!!! = !"Φ!!Φ! + !! − 1 !" !!!!!− !! !" !!!!! − !" !!!!!!! − !!!!    
We can express this relationship by the function g2, !"!!!!! = !! Φ!! , !!! ,…  
where from g1 and g2,   !"!!!!! = !! !! , !!!!,…  
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Hence, we can express construction-cost inflation in the 
following way, !!!= ! !! !, !! , !!!!…− !! !! , !!!!,… , !"!! !! , !!!!,…!! ,!! !!!− !!!!! ,…    
A2.3 Non-tradables inflation: 
From equation 2.92, the Phillips curve for the non-tradable 
sector, we know that, !!! = ℎ !! ,!!,!! !!! − !!!!! ,…  
where  !! = !" !!!!! 
As shown previously from equation 2.118, !! = !"!!!!! = !! − ! + !"!!!!! − !" !!!  
and, as with the previous two examples,  !! = !! !, !! ,…= !! − ! + !"!!!!!− !" !! !!!!, !!! ,…!  
Furthermore, from the previous example we know that, 
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!"!!!!! = !! !! , !!!!,…  
Now, from equation 2.121 we know,  !" !!!!! = !"!!!!! + !" !!!!! − !"Φ!!Φ! 
Therefore,  !" !!!!! = !! !, !! , !!!!… + !" !!!!! − !"Φ!!Φ! 
We can express this using the function h1,  ℎ! !, !! , !!!!… = !! !, !! , !!!!… + !" !!!!! − !"Φ!!Φ! 
Hence, we can express non-tradable inflation in the 
following way, !!!= ℎ !! !, !! , !!!!…− !! !! , !!!!,… , ℎ! !, !! , !!!!… ,!! !!!− !!!!! ,…    
A2.4 Petrol-price inflation 
Petrol-price inflation follows an exogenous process given 
by equation 2.150. Petrol-price inflation is a function of the 
nominal exchange rate.  !!! = ! Δ!"!! ,…  
From the UIP condition let, Δln!! = !! !, !! , !!!!,!!!!!!,…  
Hence, we can express petrol price inflation as,  
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!!! = ! !, !! , !!!!,!!!!!!,…  
A2.5 Output 
Actual output—that is, real GDP at time t—to be Yt, is 
given by, !! = !!! + !!! + !!! + !!! + !!! + !!! + !! + !!! + !!!−!!! −!!! 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to derive the IS equation 
implied by the model. However, we know that this would imply 
that output is negatively correlated with current and expected 
future policy rates and we can generalise this relationship in the 
following way,  !! = ! !! ,!!!!!!,…  
A3 The optimisation problem: 
As described previously, the period t loss function is given 
by, !! = 12 1− !! − !! − !! !!! + !!!!!+ !!!!!+!!!!! − 2 ! + ! !! − ! !+ ! !! − !!!! !  
Substituting in the derived equations for output and the 
components of CPI inflation gives, 
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!!= 12 1− !! − !! − !! !! !, !! , !!!!…− !! !! , !!!!,… , ℎ! !, !! , !!!!… ,!! !!!− !!!!! ,…+ !!! !! !, !! , !!!!…− !! !! , !!!!,… , !"!! !! , !!!!,…!! ,!! !!!− !!!!! ,…  + !!! !" !! !, !! , !!!!,!!!!!!!!− !! !! , !,… , !! !, !!!!!!,… , !" !! !, !! , !!!!!!!!!!,…!!− !! !! , !,… ,!! !!!!!− !!! ,… +!!! !, !! , !!!!,!!!!!!,… − 2 !
+ ! ! !! ,!!!!!!,… − ! ! + ! !! − !!!! !  
Now in accordance with the PTA, in period t the RBNZ 
wishes to choose the optimal path of monetary policy such that 
the intertemporal loss function is minimised over the medium 
term. We assume that the medium term is a 12 quarter time 
horizon.  
Hence, in period t, the RBNZ chooses !! , !!!!,… , !!!!"  to 
minimise, 
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!! = !!!!!"!!!  
Hence, the optimisation problem of the RBNZ is given by, min!!,!!!!,…,!!!!" !! 
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First order conditions are found by computing, !!!!!! = 0;    !!!!!!!! = 0;… ;    !!!!!!!!" = 0 
Solving these first order conditions simultaneously yields 
the following reaction function, !! = !! !!!!,!!!! ,!!!!!!,…+ !! … , !!!!, !!!!,!!!!!!,!!!!!!,…+ !! !,…  
